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In a seminal contribution, Yi (2003) has shown that 
vertically specialized trade should be more sensitive to 
changes in trade costs than regular trade. Yet empirical 
evidence of this remains remarkably scant. This paper 
uses data from China’s processing trade regime to analyze 
the role of trade costs on trade within global production 
networks (GPNs). Under this regime, firms are granted 
duty exemptions on imported inputs as long as they 
are used solely for export purposes. As a result, the data 
provide information on trade between three sequential 
nodes of a global supply chain: the location of input 
production, the location of processing (in China) and the 
location of further consumption. This makes it possible 
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to examine the role of both trade costs related to the 
import of inputs (upstream trade costs) and trade costs 
related to the export of final goods (downstream trade 
costs) on intra-GPN trade. The authors show that intra-
GPN trade differs from regular trade in that it not only 
depends on downstream trade costs, but also on upstream 
trade costs and the interaction of both. Moreover, intra-
GPN trade is more sensitive to oil price movements and 
business cycle movements than regular trade. Finally, the 
paper analyzes three channels through which intra-GPN 
trade have amplified the trade collapse during the recent 
Global Recession. The Role of Trade Costs in Global Production Networks. 
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1.  Introduction 
Vertical specialization has been one of the most notable trends in the international 
organization of production during the last few decades (Helpman, 2006; Spencer, 2006; 
Desai, 2009). Thanks to reductions in communication, transportation and other trade 
barriers, multinational firms have sliced up their supply chains and have dispersed their 
production activities across multiple countries. This means that a single final good is 
often worked on in many countries, with each sequential node in the supply chain 
performed in the location that is most advantageous for the process. 
A prominent question in the literature on vertical specialization is the role of trade costs 
on trade within global production networks (GPNs). In a seminal theoretical paper, Yi 
(2003) has formally demonstrated that intra-GPN trade should be more sensitive to 
changes in trade costs than regular trade since vertical specialization leads to products 
crossing borders many more times before reaching the final consumer. Yi (2003) has 
used this insight to explain how a relatively small reduction in tariffs could explain the 
rapid growth of world trade in the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, 
Rubin and Tal (2008) and Rubin (2009) have built on this theory to conjecture that rising 
oil prices will lead to a major slowdown in the growth of world trade and especially intra-
GPN trade. Finally, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2009) and Yi (2009) have used the notion 
to attribute the large trade collapse during the recent Great Recession to the impact of 
rising trade costs associated with evaporating credit, increasing non-tariff barriers and 
home bias in government stimulus plans on global supply chains.
1   
Largely due to data limitations, empirical research on the sensitivity of intra-GPN trade 
on trade costs has been scant.
2 In this paper, we take advantage of a unique data set on 
China’s processing trade regime for the period from 1988 to 2008 to analyze the role of 
trade costs on intra-GPN trade. Under this customs regime, firms are granted duty 
exemptions on imported raw materials and other inputs as long as they are used solely for 
export purposes. As a result, the data set provides, for each Chinese processing location, 
                                                            
1 This argument has been contested by Hoekman, Martin and Mattoo (2009) and Kee, Neagu and Nicita 
(2010), among others. See the discussion in section 6. 
2 A notable exception is Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2004), who have examined the role of trade costs 
for the decisions by U.S. multinationals to export intermediate goods to their foreign affiliates for 
processing. 3 
 
a unique mapping of the source countries where processing inputs are imported from and 
the destination countries of processed exports. This makes it possible to examine the role 
of both trade costs related to the import of inputs (upstream trade costs) and trade costs 
related to the export of final goods (downstream trade costs) on intra-GPN trade. Such 
mapping of GPNs cannot be conducted with regular trade data since imports are not 
necessarily used solely for export purposes, but can also be consumed domestically, as 
we explain in Section 2.  
In Section 3, we identify three stylized facts that suggest that both upstream and 
downstream trade costs play an important role on China’s processing trade. First, China’s 
processing exports heavily rely on foreign inputs, with a relatively low share of the value 
made in China. According to a recent estimate by Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008), only 
18% of China’s processing exports value is produced in China, while the remaining 82% 
consists of the value of imported processing inputs. Second, the average distance traveled 
by processing imports (import distance) is shorter than the average distance traveled by 
processing exports (export distance). In 2008, 75% of China’s processing imports 
originated from within the East Asian region, while 62% of the processing exports were 
destined to non-Asian OECD countries. Third, this spatial pattern is not consistent across 
processing locations. In a cross-section of 29 Chinese provinces, import distance is 
negatively correlated to export distance for most years between 1995 and 2008. In other 
words, locations in China that import their processing inputs from nearby tend to export 
their processed goods far away, and vice versa.
3  
To explain the role of trade costs on intra-GPN trade, we in Section 4 develop a three-
country general-equilibrium trade model.
4 In the model, the world consists of three 
countries:  East (for advanced East Asian countries), West (for Europe and North 
America), and China. Multinational firms from the two advanced regions, East and West, 
sell goods in each other’s markets. Each firm can serve the other market in one of two 
                                                            
3 In this paper, “province” encompasses all of China’s first-tier administrative divisions: provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions. We have excluded Tibet and Ningxia from our analysis since they 
have no processing trade in at least one year of our data sample. Furthermore, we treat Hong Kong SAR, 
China; Macau SAR, China and Taiwan, China as foreign economies. 
4 Our model builds on the recent export platform FDI literature by Yeaple (2003), Grossman, Helpman and 
Szeidl  (2006) and Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007). It is a generalized version of the model 
developed by Ma, Van Assche and Hong (2009). 4 
 
ways. It can produce its goods at home and directly export them to the other market. 
Alternatively, it can indirectly export its goods to the other market by assembling them in 
the low cost country, China. Since China is located in the vicinity of East, the model 
provides an explanation for the negative correlation between export and import distance 
for  China’s processing trade: the inputs that China imports from nearby East are 
processed into final goods and exported to the far-away West; conversely, the inputs that 
China imports from the far-away West are processed into final goods and exported to the 
nearby  East. Furthermore, the model allows us to develop a number of testable 
hypotheses relating trade costs to China’s processing trade patterns. First, China’s 
processing exports should be negatively affected by both an increase in import distance 
and an increase in export distance. Second, China’s processing exports to East should be 
more sensitive to export distance and less sensitive to import distance than its processing 
exports to West. The intuition underlying the model is the following. For Eastern firms, 
the key distance factor that determines China’s attractiveness as a processing location is 
its vicinity to Eastern input suppliers, i.e. import distance. The larger is import distance, 
the less attractive China becomes as a location for processing activities and therefore the 
less processed goods China exports. Conversely, for Western  firms, the critical 
determinant of China’s attractiveness as a processing location is its proximity to the East 
Asian market, i.e. export distance. The larger is export distance, the less attractive China 
becomes as a location for processing activities.  Using China’s bilateral processing trade 
data, we find support for the theoretical predictions of the model. Specifically, our 
empirical analysis provides evidence that China’s processing exports are negatively 
affected by both import and export distance. Furthermore, it shows that processing 
exports to East Asian countries are more sensitive to export distance and less sensitive to 
import distance than processing exports to non-Asian OECD countries.  
In Section 5, we take advantage of the panel structure of the processing trade data to 
investigate whether rising oil prices have rendered intra-GPN trade more sensitive to 
distance-related trade costs. We find evidence that China’s processing exports indeed 
have become more sensitive to both import and export distance in times of rising oil 
prices. We also find that processing exports are more sensitive to oil price movements 
than non-processing exports. Specifically, an increase in oil prices tends to reduce the 5 
 
share of processing exports in total exports, and especially when destined for far away 
countries. These results are in line with Yi’s (2003) theory that intra-GPN trade is more 
sensitive to changes in trade costs than regular trade.   
In Section 6, we use the processing trade data to analyze the impact of the recent Great 
Recession on intra-GPN trade. This analysis has become particularly relevant in light of 
the great collapse in trade during the crisis, which was significantly larger than the drop 
in world GDP. While there is a general consensus among trade economists that GPNs 
played an important role in the great trade collapse, there continues to be a heated debate 
through which channels. Analyzing China’s processing trade data, we find evidence for 
the existence of three channels: a compositional effect, a trade cost effect and a bullwhip 
effect. First, in line with the compositional effect, we find that the sectors that contributed 
most to China’s exports collapse are those where processing trade is more prevalent. 
Second, we show that, within industries, processing exports consistently dropped more 
than non-processing exports during the Great Recession. This is consistent with the trade 
cost effect, since intra-GPN trade should be more sensitive to trade costs than regular 
trade. Third, in line with the bullwhip effect, we show that in virtually all industries, the 
drop in demand for China’s processing exports led to a magnified drop in processing 
imports.   
2.  Mapping Global Production Networks 
Empirical evidence on vertical specialization and the role of trade costs in GPNs is 
remarkably scant, largely because concrete evidence is difficult to obtain. To measure 
vertical specialization, one would like to know the number of countries involved in the 
production process of a specific good, the value added created in each country, and the 
sequential supply chain linkages between production activities. However, this 
information is hard to come by. Firms are generally not willing to provide data on the 
cost structure of their own supply chain activities, and often do not know the full range of 
value chain activities conducted by its suppliers.
5 Furthermore, national statistical 
                                                            
5 Dedrick, Kraemer and Linden (2010) is a rare study that has been able to capture the value added created 
by a lead firm and its most important component suppliers for specific electronics products. For this 6 
 
agencies do not generally track the domestic value added of goods that their countries 
trade, nor do they track the use of these traded goods, that is, whether they are used for 
sales to final consumers, whether they are used for further processing in a specific 
industry, and what share of this industry’s output is exported.   
In the field of international economics, scholars have used a variety of approaches to gain 
insights into the structure of GPNs. One method has been to rely on the highly 
disaggregated product codes and descriptions in international trade statistics to classify 
traded goods according to their main use. Yeats (2001) and Ng and Yeats (2001), for 
example, categorized intermediate goods as those products whose description include the 
words “parts” or “components”. Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2004) and Zebregs (2004) 
used the United Nation's "Broad Economic Categories" (BEC) classification to 
distinguish between intermediate and final goods. While this approach has been useful to 
demonstrate the large and growing role of GPNs in international trade, it faces two 
important shortcomings. First, classifying goods according to their product codes is 
somewhat arbitrary since product descriptions provide insufficient information to identify 
a product’s main use (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001). Indeed, some goods, such as tires, 
can be used both as a final good by consumers and as an intermediate good by car 
manufacturers. Second, even if traded goods were correctly classified as intermediate or 
final goods, international trade data do not identify in which sector intermediate goods 
are used, if it is processed for domestic consumption, or if it is used for export purposes. 
This makes it difficult to accurately link a trade flow with other trade flows within the 
same GPN.  
An alternative approach used to map activities within GPNs is to combine international 
trade data with input-output (IO) table data. The advantage of IO data is that – for 
domestic activities – it unambiguously defines intermediate inputs by their use, i.e., in 
which industry they are put to use and what share of the industry’s output is exported. 
This information on main use, however, is not available for imported goods in many 
input-output tables. Lacking this information, researchers have adopted the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
purpose, they have relied on lists of components and their factory prices from industry analysts’ 
“teardown” reports, which capture the composition of the product at a specific point in time.  7 
 
proportionality assumption to approximate the main use of imports. That is, every 
domestic sector is assumed to import inputs in the same proportion as its economy-wide 
use of that input. For example, if an industry such as electronics relies on semiconductors 
and 10% of all semiconductors are imported, it is assumed that 10% of the 
semiconductors used by the electronics industry is imported. With this assumption, 
scholars have been able to link the flow of imported inputs to the flow of exported goods 
within the same global production network. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Johnson 
and Noguera (2009) have used this approach to quantify the import content embodied in a 
country’s exports. Recent studies, then again, have questioned the accuracy of the 
proportionality assumption. Winkler and Milberg (2009) have shown that, in Germany, 
the cross-sectoral variation in the use of imported inputs differs significantly from the 
cross-sectoral variation in the use of domestic inputs. Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) 
show that China’s policy preferences for processing exports has led to a significant 
difference in the intensity of imported inputs in the production for processing exports 
than in other productions (for domestic final sales and non-processing exports).  
A third approach has been to use firm-level data on multinationals to measure the 
dispersion of GPNs. Collinson and Rugman (2008), Rugman, Li and Oh (2009) and 
Rugman and Oh (2009), for example, use data on the geographic distribution of assets for 
large multinational firms to measure the dispersion of GPNs. Hanson, Mataloni and 
Slaughter (2005) use BEA data on U.S. multinationals to estimate the drivers of trade in 
intermediate inputs for further processing between parent firms and their foreign 
affiliates.  These studies, however, give an incomplete and potentially biased picture of 
the organization of GPNs since many multinationals outsource a large portion of their 
manufacturing activities to external firms (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005; Swenson, 2006; Bonham, Gangnes and Van Assche, 2007; Desai, 2009). 
If these outsourced activities are more dispersed geographically than the assets owned by 
the multinational firms, the existing estimates on the dispersion of upstream activities 
will be biased.  
In this paper, we will exploit a unique data set that allows us to overcome some of the 
shortcomings in the existing literature. Specifically, we will exploit a data set collected 
by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China on China’s 8 
 
processing trade regime. Under this regime, firms are granted duty exemptions on 
imported raw materials and other inputs as long as they are used solely for export 
purposes. Since imported processing inputs may not be consumed domestically, the 
processing trade data provides, for each processing location, a unique mapping of the 
source countries where processing inputs are imported from and the destination countries 
of processed exports. This makes it possible to directly link imported inputs to exported 
products within the same GPNs, without relying on the proportionality assumption. 
Furthermore, since the processing trade data incorporate both intra-firm and arm’s length 
trade, it provides a more complete measure of trade flows within GPNs. In the next 
section, we provide an overview of the processing trade data and identify three stylized 
facts that relate import and export distance to processing trade patterns. 
3.  China’s Processing Trade Regime 
China’s processing trade regime was installed in the mid-eighties in order to both attract 
foreign direct investment and promote exports. Under the regime, firms were granted 
duty exemptions on imported raw materials and other inputs as long as they are used 
solely for export purposes. Largely ignored by many scholars, the regime was much more 
far-reaching than similar systems introduced in other East Asian economies. Unlike in its 
neighboring countries, China’s concessionary provisions were not geographically limited 
within strictly policed export processing zones, but rather applied over its entire territory 
(Naughton, 2006). As a result, China’s processing trade regime has turned into an 
important part of its overall trade performance. As it is illustrated in Figure 1, between 
1988 and 2008, the share of processing exports (i.e. exports conducted under the 
processing regime) in China's total exports has risen from 30% to 51%, while the share of 
processing imports in total imports has increased from 27% to 38%.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
A special characteristic of China’s processing exports is that it more heavily relies on 
imported inputs than China’s non-processing exports. According to recent estimates by 
Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008), only 18.1% of China’s processing export value is 
produced in China, while the remaining 81.9% consists of the value of imported inputs 9 
 
(see Figure 2). In comparison, the domestic content share of China’s non-processing 
exports stood at a much higher 88.7%, meaning that imported inputs only represented 
11.3% of the export value.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
In this section, we are primarily interested in the geographic characteristics of China’s 
processing trade regime. To analyze the countries of origin of processing imports and the 
destination countries of processing exports, an important data issue that needs to be 
addressed is that 90% of China’s trade with its largest trading partner, Hong Kong SAR, 
China, are re-exported elsewhere (Feenstra, Hai, Woo and Yao, 1999; Feenstra, Hanson 
and Lin, 2004; Ferrantino and Wang, 2007).  This can significantly affect the analysis 
since it biases the true source country of processing imports and the true destination 
country of processing exports that are shipped through Hong Kong SAR, China. To 
account for these re-exports, we follow Ma, Van Assche and Hong (2009) by linking the 
processing trade data from China’s Customs Statistics to a data set from Hong Kong 
SAR, China’s Census and Statistical Office on its re-exports. This allows us to estimate 
the country of origin of processing imports re-exported through Hong Kong SAR, China 
and the destination country of processing exports re-exported through Hong Kong SAR, 
China. A comparison of columns 1-2 and 3-4 in Table 1 illustrates the impact of adjusting 
for re-exports through Hong Kong SAR, China on China’s processing trade with its 
major trading partners. It almost doubles the share of processing imports originating from 
China’s other major trading partners and increases by a quarter the share of processing 
exports destined to these same economies.  
[Table 1 about here] 
China’s processing trade regime heavily relies on East Asian inputs. As it is shown in 
Figure 3, China heavily sources its inputs from neighboring East Asian economies, with 
75.1% of its processing imports originating from within East Asia in 2008. By contrast 10 
 
the United States, EU-19
6 and Canada contributed relatively little to the supply of 
processing inputs, together accounting for less than 19% of processing imports in 2008. 
This asymmetric sourcing pattern of processing inputs has become more pronounced over 
time. Between 1988 and 2008, the share of processing imports originating from China’s 
most important East Asian trading partners has risen from 59.6% to 75.1%, while the 
share of processing imports originating from non-Asian OECD countries has decreased 
from 37.7% to 18.7% over the same period.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Conversely, the majority of processing exports are destined to non-Asian OECD 
countries, except for an interlude between 1992 and 1997. As it is shown in Figure 4, the 
share of processing exports destined to non-Asian OECD economies has risen from 
54.7% in 1997 to 59.4% in 2008. On the contrary, the share of processing exports 
destined within the East Asian region has declined from 36.0% to 28.3% during the same 
period. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
This unbalanced processing trade pattern is generally attributed to the reorganization of 
GPNs in East Asia (Yoshida and Ito, 2006; Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2007; 
Haddad, 2007). With rising costs in Japan and the Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NIEs) – Taiwan, China; Singapore; South Korea and Hong Kong SAR, China – East 
Asian firms are increasingly using China as a lower cost export platform. Instead of 
directly exporting their final goods to the Western markets, these firms now export high 
value intermediate goods to their processing plants in China and then export it on to the 
West after assembly. As a result, it is argued that a triangular trade pattern has emerged in 
GPNs in which China heavily relies on processing inputs from East Asia, while 
predominantly sending processed goods to the West. 
                                                            
6 The EU-19 include all European Union countries prior to the accession of the 10 candidate countries on 1 
May 2004, plus the four eastern European member countries of the OECD, namely Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic. 11 
 
Data on the bilateral intensity of China’s processing trade provide further evidence of this 
triangular trade structure. As it is shown in Figure 5, East Asian economies more 
intensively supply China with processing inputs than countries outside of East Asia. 
Except for Indonesia and Vietnam, more than 35% of China’s imports from its major 
East Asian trading partners were processing imports in 2007 (see Figure 5). Almost 40% 
of its imports from Japan and between 40% and 60% of its imports from the Newly 
Industrialized Economies were aimed at supplying inputs for processing industries. This 
is a significantly higher share than for Western economies. The share of processing 
imports in China’s total imports from the EU-19, Canada and the United States amounted 
to 15.4%, 17.6% and 25.0%, respectively. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
At the same time, China more intensively supplies processed goods to developed 
economies than to its East Asian neighbors. As it is shown in Figure 6, more than 50% of 
the exports that China sends to the United States, the EU-19 and Japan are processing 
exports. For most developing East Asian economies the number is significantly lower.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
The triangular trade pattern suggests that China is primarily used as an export platform by 
East Asian firms that sell their goods to Western markets. However, in a cross-section of 
29 Chinese provinces, the weighted average distance traveled by processing imports 
(import distance) has been negatively correlated to the weighted average distance 
travelled by processing exports (export distance) for most years between 1995 to 2008 
(Ma, Van Assche and Hong, 2009). In other words, locations in China that import their 
processing inputs from nearby tend to export their processed goods far away and vice 
versa. 
4.  Trade Costs and Intra-GPN Trade 
To understand the role of trade costs on China’s processing trade, we in subsection 4.1 
develop a theoretical model that builds on a recent literature about export platform FDI 12 
 
(Yeaple, 2003; Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl, 2006; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 
2007). In section 4.2 and 4.3, we set up the empirical specification and empirically test 
the hypotheses that come from the model. In section 4.4, we analyze the impact of growth 
rebalancing on China’s processing trade.  
4.1. Theoretical framework
7 
Consider a world with three countries. There are two advanced countries, East and West, 
which have high wages and large markets for differentiated products. In addition, there is 
a third country China that has low wages and no local market for differentiated products.
8  
Households in the two advanced countries consume goods produced by two industries. 
One industry manufactures homogeneous products in a perfectly competitive 
environment, while the other produces differentiated goods under monopolistically 
competitive conditions. Consumers’ preferences are characterized by the utility function  
                  
     
 / 
,     0       1, (1) 
Where    is a homogeneous good, q(v) is the vth variety in the differentiated goods sector 
and n is the measure of varieties in the industry. With this utility function, the elasticity of 
substitution between any pair of differentiated goods is     1/ 1     . Maximizing the 
utility function subject to the consumer’s expenditure generates the demand function that 
a firm producing variety v faces in advanced country i: 
                , (2) 
where the demand level A
i is exogenous from the point of view of the individual firm.
9  
The monopolistically competitive firm charges the following price for its product:   
       
    
  , (3) 
                                                            
7 This is a generalized version of the model developed by Ma, Van Assche and Hong (2009). 
8 The assumption that China does not have a market for the industry’s output is not limiting since, by the 
very nature of the processing trade regime, processed goods are not allowed to be sold on the Chinese 
market. 
9 As is well known,                      
  
       in general equilibrium, where    is the measure of varieties 
available in country i and       is the price of variety v. 13 
 
where   denotes the firm’s marginal unit production cost and 1/  represents the markup 
factor.  
The countries differ in several ways. First, advanced country firms are more productive 
than Chinese firms in producing the homogeneous good   . We assume that one unit of 
labor is needed to produce one unit of the homogeneous good in East and West, but that 
1/w>1 units of labor are needed to produce one unit of the good in China. We also 
assume that the homogeneous good is produced in equilibrium in all three countries and 
take this good to be the numéraire. This implies that          1        , where 
    is the wage in country i. Second, the market size for differentiated products differs 
across countries. We denote by    the number of households in country i that consume 
differentiated products and assume that   ,    0  and       0 . Third, China is located 
closer to East than to West, while West is equidistant to both East and China. Denote 
ij 
as the melting-iceberg trade cost of shipping goods from country i to country j, where 
ii 
= 1 and 
ij = 
ji > 1 for i ≠ j. We assume that trade costs increase linearly with distance so 
that 
EC = t < 
WC = 
WE =  (see Figure 7).
10 These geographic assumptions reflect the 
notion that China acts as the low-cost processing platform in the vicinity of East. To see 
this, note the differential impact that an increase in trade costs t and  play in our model. 
A rise in t increases trade costs only between East and China, thus making it less 
attractive to indirectly export through China. Conversely, a rise in  increases the trade 
costs between West and China as well as West and East, thus reducing the incentives of 
both direct and indirect exports. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
In the remainder of the model, we focus on the differentiated goods industry. To simplify 
notation, we will in the rest of the model drop the v’s. In the differentiated goods 
industry, we assume that firms are heterogeneous and can only enter as producers of 
differentiated products in the two advanced countries and that such firms must locate 
their headquarters and produce their intermediate goods in their country of origin. Entry 
                                                            
10 A recent debate has emerged on whether trade costs are truly a linear function of distance (e.g, Brun, 
Carrère, Guillaumont and de Melo, 2005; Coe, Subramanian and Tamirisa, 2007). In this paper, we follow 
the standard approach in gravity regressions of using distance as a proxy for trade costs. 14 
 
requires a firm to bear a fixed fee Fe, measured in labor units. With this fee, the entrant 
acquires the design for a differentiated product and draws a labor-per-unit-output 
coefficient of   from a cumulative Pareto distribution G(a) with shape parameter z.
11 
Upon observing this draw, the firm decides either to exit the industry or to start 
producing. If it decides to produce, it bears an additional fixed cost fD of initiating 
production operations. There are no other fixed costs when the firm sells only for the 
domestic market. If the firm chooses to export to the foreign market, however, it bears an 
additional fixed cost fX of forming a distribution and servicing network in the foreign 
country. Finally, if it sets up a processing plant abroad, it bears one additional fixed cost 
fO. 
The marginal cost structure of a product depends on the firm’s organizational form. Each 
firm needs to produce its intermediate good in its home country at cost        , where   
equals the firm’s labor-per-unit-output coefficient. The final good can then be processed 
in any country l   { E,W,C} at an extra ad valorem cost w
l. The combination of 
production costs and trade costs implies that the unit cost of producing an intermediate 
good in country j, processing it into a final good in country l and delivering the final 
goods to country i equals: 
                 , (4) 
To maximize the number of organizational forms that coexist in the industry, we take on 
the following assumption: 
         
        
     
 (5) 
This assumption ensures that at least one domestic firm processes its final goods locally 
and at least one foreign firm produces its goods locally. Dropping this assumption does 
not alter the key results of the model.
12 The assumption in equation (5) then implies that, 
in equilibrium, there are four types of firms that sell their final goods in advanced country 
i:  
                                                            
11 Our model features intra-industry firm heterogeneity as developed by Melitz (2003). 
12 Ma, Van Assche and Hong (2009) show that hypotheses 1 and 2 hold in the more restrictive model where 
firms cannot offshore production to China for sale in their home country.  15 
 
  Type-D firms are domestic firms, headquartered in country i, that process and sell 
their final goods in their home country. 
  Type-O firms are domestic firms, headquartered in country i, that offshore their 
final good processing to China and sell in their home country. 
  Type-X firms are foreign firms that are headquartered in country     , process 
their final goods in advanced country      and export to i. 
  Type-T firms are foreign firms that are headquartered in advanced country     , 
process their final goods in China and then export to country i. For this type of 
firms, there is a triangular trade pattern.  
Using equations (1)-(4), we can derive the operating profits that the four types of firms 
face in the markets East and West: 
Table 2: Profit functions 
  Market East Market  West 
Type-D firm    
                    
                 
Type-O firm    
                               
                            
Type-X firm    
                             
                          
Type-T firm    
                                    
                                  
where B
i = (1 − )A
i/
1−ε.  
Note that if        in Table 2, the profit functions for Type-D firms, Type-X firms and 
Type-T firms are identical in East and West. For Type-O firms, however,   
      
 . Since 
trade costs are higher between West and China than between East and China (see Figure 
7), it is more costly for Western firms to offshore to China than for Eastern firms. 
In Figure 8, we depict the profit functions of the four firm-types that are selling in 
country i. In this figure, a
1-  ε is represented on the horizontal axis. Since ε > 1, this 
variable increases monotonically with labor productivity 1/a, and can be used as a 16 
 
productivity index.
13 All four profit functions are increasing with this productivity index: 
more productive firms are more profitable for all four firm types.  
[Figure 8 about here] 
Figure 8 illustrates that domestic and foreign firms can be ranked according to 
productivity. Consider first the domestic firms in country i. For a given productivity 
level, type-D firms face a lower fixed cost but a higher marginal cost than type-O firms. 
This implies that domestic firms with a productivity level below    
   
   
 expect negative 
operating profits and exit the industry, firms with productivity levels between    
   
   
 
and    
   
   
 become type-D firms, and firms with productivity levels above    
   
   
 
become type-O firms. In other words, the most productive domestic firms offshore their 
production to China (Type-O), while the less productive firms produce their final goods 
locally (Type-D). 
Foreign firms face a similar pattern. For a given productivity level, type-X firms face a 
lower fixed cost but a higher marginal cost than type-T firms. This means that foreign 
firms with productivity levels below    
   
   
 do not sell their products in country i; 
foreign firms with productivity between    
   
   
 and    
   
   
 become type-X firms; 
while those with a productivity higher than    
   
   
 become type-T firms.  In other 
words, the most productive foreign firms offshore their production to China (Type-T), 
while the less productive foreign firms produce their final goods in their home country 
(Type-X). 




1-ε depicted in Figure 8 solve the following equations:  
Table 3: Cut-off conditions 
  Market East Market  West 
Type-D firm     
                  
              
                                                            
13 This graphical approach of presenting the results is adopted from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). 17 
 
Type-O firm     
                  1             
                  1         
Type-X firm      
                         
                    
Type-T firm      
                 1              
                 1         
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating profits of a potential entrant 
and the entry cost Fe. The free entry condition then provides implicit solutions for the 
cutoff coefficients a
i
k and the demand levels    in every country.  
The industry sales of firm-type k in country i amounts to the joint revenue of all type k 
firms in country i. Using equations (2) and (3), it is straightforward to show that firm 
revenues in country i can be expressed as   
   
  
   
      , where c is given by equation (4). 
By taking the integral of all firms of type k operating in country i, the industry sales of 
each firm type k in country i equals: 
Table 4: Industry sales 
  Market East Market  West 
Type-D firm  Ω 
   
                         
1  
  Ω 
   
                         
1  
 
Type-O firm  Ω 
   
               
1  
  Ω 
   
               
1  
 
Type-X firm  Ω 
   
                            
1  
  Ω 
   
                            
1  
 
Type-T firm  Ω 
   
               
1  
  Ω 
   
               
1  
 
where                   .
 
   
Table 4 provides us with sufficient information to derive a closed form solution for 
China’s processing exports. As it is shown in Figure 9, processing exports from China to 
country i equals the aggregate sales of Type-O domestic firms and Type-T foreign firms 
in country i, i.e. the sum of Ω 
    Ω 
  . 
[Figure 9 about here] 18 
 
In the appendix, we derive two testable hypotheses related to China’s processing exports:  
Hypothesis 1:  Ceteris paribus, China’s bilateral processing exports are negatively 
affected by both an increase in import distance and an increase in export distance. 
The intuition behind this hypothesis is straightforward. Since China’s processing exports 
by both Type-O and Type-T firms rely on imported inputs, and since the cost of importing 
inputs is a function of distance, an increase in import distance raises the price of Chinese 
processing exports, thus leading to a reduction the bilateral export value. Similarly, an 
increase in export distance negatively affects processing exports by increasing costs.  
The implications for the empirical specification are nonetheless important. Empirical 
studies in the field of international economics such as gravity models do generally not 
take into account the role of import distance on exports. In this respect, our results are in 
line with the New Economic Geography literature that highlights that a country’s exports 
not only rely on foreign market access, but also on supplier access (Redding and 
Venables, 2004).  
We also derive that:  
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, China’s processing exports to East are (i) more sensitive 
to export distance and (ii) less sensitive to import distance than its processing exports to 
the West. 
This result is largely driven by the differential impact that t and  have on the processing 
exports of type-T foreign firms. Type-T foreign firms’ processing exports to both East 
and West are more sensitive to an increase in t than to an increase in . The differential 
impact is related to the assumption that China is the low-cost processing platform in the 
vicinity of East. On the one hand, an increase in t only raises the trade costs related to 
using China as an export platform. As a result, it reduces the attractiveness of triangular 
exports through China, thus inducing some foreign firms to substitute from a Type-T firm 
to a Type-X firm. This leads to an increase in the relative market share of type-X firms to 
type-T firms in country i. On the other hand, an increase in  raises the trade costs for 
both Type-X firms and Type-T firms. In our model, it therefore leaves the relative market 
share of type-X firms to type-T firms unchanged. 19 
 
Since t and  have opposing roles for type-T firms’ processing exports to East and West, 
the differential impact leads to Hypothesis 2. When exporting to West, t reflects the trade 
costs related to import distance and  reflects the trade costs related to export distance. 
Conversely, when exporting to East, t reflects the trade costs related to export distance 
and  reflects the trade costs related to import distance. This implies that type-T firms’ 
processing exports to East are (i) more sensitive to export distance and (ii) less sensitive 
to import distance than its processing exports to the West. 
Finally, we show in the appendix that Hypothesis 2, not only applies for processing 
exports by Type-T firms, but to total processing exports by both Type-T and Type-O 
firms. Since for Type-O firms import distance is identical to export distance, type-O 
firms’ processing exports are equally sensitive to import distance as to export distance, 
and very similar in magnitude. Hypothesis 2 therefore continues to hold.   
4.2. Empirical Specification  
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate an augmented gravity model on Chinese 
provinces’ processing exports with their foreign trading partners (adjusted for Hong 
Kong SAR, China re-exports) for the period 1988-2008. Specifically, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 ln                            ln          ln                l n                  l n              
    ,                        ( 6 )  
where the natural log of processing exports from a Chinese province i to a destination 
country  j in year t, lnXijt, is the dependent variable; XDij is export distance between 
province i and country j; MDit is the weighted import distance for province i in period t; 
     refers to a standard vector of time-varying province-specific control variables, Eastj 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the destination is an East Asian economy, and is 0 
otherwise and      is a normally distributed error term.
14  
                                                            
14 Our data consists of China’s East Asia neighbors (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, China and Hong Kong SAR, China) and the Non-Asian OECD countries 
(Australia, Canada, United States, and EU-19) since as shown in Table 1 the share of its processing imports 
and exports from these trading partners accounts for most of its trade with 95.4% and 87.8%, respectively.   20 
 
Our model includes two independent distance variables to capture the role of trade costs. 
To measure export distance (XDij), we use the arc distance between the Chinese port 
closest to province i and the destination country j. To measure import distance (MDit), we 
need to take into account that multiple inputs from various economies are used in the 
production of a specific export good. As a consequence, we measure import distance 
using the following formula: 
        ∑
    
∑       
.         ,  (7) 
where Mijt is province i’s imports from country j in period t; and XDij is the arc distance 
between the Chinese port closest to province i and the source country j.  
To analyze if China’s processing exports to East Asian economies are more sensitive to 
export distance and less sensitive to import distance than its processing exports to 
Western countries, we introduce a dummy variable, Eastj , that equals 1 if the economy of 
destination is an East Asian economy and 0 if the destination market is a non-Asian 
OECD country. We then introduce interaction terms between Eastj and our two distance 
variables lnXDij and lnMDit as independent variables in our model.  
Hypothesis 1 will be confirmed if lnXDij and lnMDit both have a negative effect on 
processing exports. Hypothesis 2 will be validated if (i) the coefficient on the interaction 
term between Eastj and lnXDij is significantly negative and (ii) the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Eastj and lnMDit is significantly positive. 
We estimate the effect of distance on processing exports using a standard set of controls. 
Specifically, we use data from, respectively, China’s Statistical Yearbook to include 
controls for GDP per capita and population size for Chinese provinces. We also use data 
from China’s Statistical Yearbook to add a control for Chinese provincial wages.  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) highlighted the importance of controlling for 
multilateral resistance in gravity models, i.e. the fact that bilateral flows not only depend 
on bilateral trade barriers but also on trade barriers across all trading partners. To 
construct a specification that captures multilateral resistance, we follow Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001) and Feenstra (2004) by adding both exporter-specific and importer-
specific fixed effects. Ideally these fixed effects should be time-varying since the 21 
 
multilateral resistance term may vary over time (Egger, 2008). The inclusion of time-
varying exporter-specific fixed effects, however, would mean that no time-varying 
parameters specific to an exporting province such as import distance can be estimated. As 
a robustness check, we include time-varying importer-specific effects. Finally, we use 
time fixed effects to account for economic shocks common to all country pairs.
15  
There is a potential endogeneity bias in that omitted variables could be correlated with 
gravity variables (GDP per capita, population, distance) and the level of bilateral trade.   
We follow Sissoko (2004) and Carrère (2006) in using the Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
estimation model to select the appropriate instruments. 
4.3. Regression Results  
Table 5 presents our OLS estimation results of equation (6). Column 1 includes the 
independent variables that are generally used in gravity equations. Column 2 adds import 
distance lnMDit as an independent variables. Column 3 includes the dummy variable 
Eastj and the interaction terms.   
[Table 5 about here] 
The results provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, we find evidence for 
Hypothesis 1. Specifically, in column 2, both coefficients on import distance and export 
distance are negative and statistically significant. In column 3, the coefficient on import 
distance remains negative and statistically significant, but the coefficient on export 
distance becomes insignificant. 
The results also confirm Hypothesis 2. Specifically, we find that in column 3 the 
coefficient on EastjlnXDij is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient 
on EastjlnMDit is positive and statistically significant. In line with Hypothesis 2, this 
suggests that processing exports destined to East Asian economies are more sensitive to 
export distance and less sensitive to import distance than processing exports destined to 
non-Asian OECD countries.  
                                                            
15 Other studies have argued for the inclusion of pair fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics 
of pairs of countries, but this would mean that no time-invariant parameters such as export distance 
elasticity can be estimated (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 22 
 
The OLS results do not take into account the potential endogeneity of import distance and 
GDP per capita. To account for this, we apply the instrumental variables estimation 
proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The corresponding Hausman test leads us to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level of significance and conclude that the model 
with the internal instruments provides most efficient estimates. The results are presented 
in Table 6. Column 1 replicates the OLS regression results in column 3 of Table 5. 
Columns 2-4 provide the Hausman-Taylor estimates for different combinations of 
endogenous variables. The results continue to provide supporting evidence for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
[Table 6 about here] 
In sum, we find that China’s processing exports not only depend on downstream trade 
costs, but also on upstream trade costs. Specifically, we find that processing exports are 
negatively affected by both import and export distance. Furthermore, processing exports 
destined to East Asian economies are more sensitive to export distance and less sensitive 
to import distance than processing exports destined to non-Asian OECD countries.  
4.4. Growth Rebalancing and China’s processing trade 
The model can also be used to analyze the impact on China’s processing trade patterns of 
a shift in final goods demand from Western countries to East Asia. This exercise is of 
particular interest since many scholars consider the rebalancing of East Asia’s growth 
away from heavy dependence on external demand towards increased reliance on intra-
regional demand to be a key global policy priority to forestall the reemergence of global 
imbalances (Prasad, 2009; Petri, 2010; International Monetary Fund, 2010). Prior to the 
Great Recession, the large current account deficits of the United States and a few other 
advanced economies, combined with the large current account surpluses of oil-exporting 
countries and emerging Asian markets such as China, were considered a key source of 
global economic instability (Suominen, 2010).  23 
 
As it has been demonstrated in Section 3, China’s processing trade regime has played an 
important role in fueling China’s bilateral trade surplus with many Western economies.
16 
Whereas China heavily relies on processing inputs from within the East Asian region, it 
predominantly sends its processed final goods to non-Asian OECD countries. This 
imbalance can be replicated in our theoretical model by assuming that the market size of 
West is significantly larger than the market size of East. From equation (A-4) and Table 
A-1 in the appendix, this benchmark scenario implies that China’s processing trade is 
dominated by Eastern Type-T firms that produce their components in East, process their 
final goods in China and export to West. 
Growth rebalancing can then be modeled as a counterfactual scenario in which there is an 
increase in the relative market size of East compared to West.
17 Using equation (A-4) and 
Table A-1, it is straightforward to show that this will weaken the observed triangular 
trade pattern through two channels. First, and most obviously, it will increase the share of 
China’s processing exports destined to East. Second, since processing exports destined to 
East rely more heavily on Western components than processing exports destined to West, 
it will decrease the share of China’s processing imports originating from East. Indeed, in 
the extreme counterfactual where the market size of East and West are symmetric, the 
triangular trade pattern completely disappears, with China both importing a 
disproportionate share of its processing inputs from East and exporting a disproportionate 
share of its processed final goods to East. 
5.  Oil Prices and Intra-GPN Trade  
The sensitivity of intra-GPN trade to changes in trade costs has been a prominent 
question in the literature of vertical specialization. In a seminal theoretical contribution, 
Yi (2003) has formally demonstrated that intra-GPN trade should be more sensitive to 
changes in trade costs than regular trade since vertical specialization leads to products 
crossing borders many more times before reaching the final consumer. He used this 
insight to explain how a relatively small reduction in tariffs could explain the rapid 
                                                            
16 See also Van Assche, Hong and Slootmaekers (2008). 
17 We do not consider a growth in China’s market since, by the nature of the processing trade regime, 
processed goods are not allowed to be sold on the Chinese market. 24 
 
growth of world trade in the second half of the twentieth century. Conversely, Rubin and 
Tal (2008) and Rubin (2009) have built on this theory to conjecture that rising oil prices 
will lead to a major slowdown in the growth of world trade, and especially intra-GPN 
trade. In this section, we will attempt to gain insights into this latter conjecture, by using 
the panel data structure of the processing trade data to analyze the sensibility of intra-
GPN trade to changes in oil prices.  
5.1. Trends in oil prices and transportation costs   
Oil prices have risen dramatically in the last decade. As it is shown in Figure 10, while 
crude oil prices were relatively stable and even declined over the period 1980-1999, they 
have rapidly increased over the period 1999-2008, growing at an annualized rate of 
20.6%. During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the oil prices have retreated (see 
Figure 10), but this is likely a temporary phenomenon. As the global economy comes out 
of the recession and as peak oil is reached, oil prices are expected to return to and even 
exceed its pre-crisis levels. Peak oil refers to the attainment of the maximum 
conventional oil output (i.e. excluding heavy oil from tar sands, oil shale etc.), expressed 
in terms of millions of barrels of crude oil extracted per day (Deffeyes, 2001). There is a 
general consensus among oil experts that peak oil will be reached prior to 2015 (De 
Almeida and Silva, 2009).  When this occurs, the gap between oil production and demand 
is expected to increase. As a consequence, the price of oil is expected to both rise 
significantly and become more volatile. 
[Figure 10 about here] 
Rubin and Tal (2008) have argued that the rise of oil prices is likely to lead to significant 
hikes in international transportation and thus will lead to a major slowdown in the growth 
of world trade. As supporting evidence, they highlight that, hand-in-hand with the oil 
price hikes, the cost to ship a standard 40-foot container from Shanghai to the U.S. 
eastern seaboard has risen from US$3,000 in 2000 to US$8000 in 2008. Other studies, 
however, have estimated that the sensitivity of shipping freight rates to oil prices remains 
relatively low, thus limiting the threat that rising oil prices will lead to a significant 
reduction in the growth of intra-GPN trade. Hummels (2007) and UNCTAD (2010) 25 
 
estimate an elasticity of maritime cargo costs with respect to fuel prices between 0.20 and 
0.40. Mirza and Zitouna (2009) estimate an even lower elasticity of freight rates to oil 
prices ranging from 0.02 to 0.15. 
To analyze if rising oil prices have made intra-GPN trade more sensitive to distance, we 
will analyze the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, a rise in oil prices increases China’s processing exports’ 
sensitivity to export distance, import distance and local distance. 
Since intra-GPN trade is conjectured to be especially sensitive to changes in trade costs 
(Yi, 2003), we will also investigate if increases in oil prices have a significantly larger 
impact on processing exports than on non-processing exports. Specifically, we will test 
the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 4:  Ceteris paribus, a rise in oil prices reduces the share of China’s 
processing exports in total exports, and especially for far away destinations. 
5.3.Empirical specification 
To test hypotheses 3, we estimate the following equation for the years 1988-2008: 
ln      
      ln          ln         t l n            l n             l n            ln      l n       
   ln      l n            ln      l n                    ,              (8) 
where t refers to a time trend, Oil refers to average crude oil prices in US$/barrel, and all 
other variables are defined in section 4.2. Equation (8) differs from equation (6) in three 
ways. First, to simplify the interpretation of the results, we have eliminated the variable 
Eastj and its interactions with export distance and import distance. Second, to account for 
time-varying trends in the elasticity of processing exports with respect to the three 
distance variables, we have included interaction terms between trend t and the three 
distance variables.
18 Third, to account for the impact of oil prices on processing exports, 
we have interacted lnOil  with the three distance variables. Hypothesis 3 will be 
                                                            
18 See Brun, Carrère, Guillaumont and de Melo (2005) and Disdier and Head (2008) for a similar approach. 26 
 
confirmed if the coefficients on the interaction terms ln      l n     , ln      l n      and  
ln      l n      all are negative. 
To test Hypothesis 4, we estimate the equation: 
ln            ln         ln          ln          ln      l n           ln      l n        
   t    t l n            l n                    ,                                                                              (9) 
where the dependent variable      is the share of processing exports in total exports from 
province i to country j in year t, and all independent variables as previously defined. It is 
important to note that we have dropped import distance (MD) as an independent variable 
in equation (9). For reasons explained in Section 2, China’s Customs Statistics data allow 
us to identify the distance from which inputs are imported (import distance) for 
processing trade, but not for regular non-processing trade.  Hypothesis 4 will be 
confirmed if the coefficients on ln     and on the interaction terms of both ln      
ln    and ln      l n       are negative. 
5.3. Regression Results 
The results from the estimation of equations (8) and (9) are presented in Table 7.  In 
columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the natural log of bilateral processing exports; 
in columns 4 to 6, the dependent variable is the natural log of the share of processing 
exports in total exports.   
[Table 7 about here] 
The results provide partial support for Hypothesis 3. In column 3, the coefficients on both 
ln      l n       and ln      l n       are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that oil price hikes do make China’s processing exports more sensitive to 
import and export distance.  The coefficient on ln      l n     , however, is positive and 
significant.  
The results for the control variables in columns 1, 2 and 3 are similar to those in the 
benchmark specification. Processing exports are larger for more populated provinces, 
with higher GDP per capita, lower internal distance and lower wages. In addition, 27 
 
processing exports are greater for destinations that are more populated and have a higher 
GDP per capita. Furthermore, we find a general trend for processing exports to become 
more sensitive to internal and import distances over time. 
The results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 4. 
In column 5, the coefficient on ln      l n       is negative, which suggests that a rise in 
oil prices reduces the share of China’s processing exports in total exports especially for 
far away destinations. Conversely, the coefficient on ln      l n      is not significant. 
The coefficients on the other control variables in columns 4, 5 and 6 suggest that the 
share of processing exports in total exports is larger for more populated provinces, closer 
to the coast with lower wages. The share is also larger when destined for richer, less 
populated countries that are further away. Finally, we find an upward trend for the share 
of processing exports in total exports, but this trend is smaller for internal provinces and 
faraway destinations. 
In conclusion, we find evidence that China’s processing exports become more sensitive 
to both import and export distance in times of rising oil prices, but not more sensitive to 
internal distance. We also find supporting evidence that processing exports are more 
sensitive to changes in trade costs related to oil price movements than non-processing 
exports. Specifically, an increase in oil prices tends to reduce the share of processing 
exports in total exports, and especially when destined for far away countries.   
6.  Intra-GPN Trade and the Great Recession 
Finally, we can use the processing trade data to examine the impact of the Great 
Recession on intra-GPN trade flows. This analysis has become particularly relevant in 
light of the collapse in trade during the crisis, which was significantly larger than the drop 
in world GDP. A number of scholars have attributed the disproportionate trade collapse 
to vertical specialization. Barry Eichengreen, for example, stated that “the most important 
factor is probably the growth of global supply chains, which has magnified the impact of 
declining final demand on trade” (International Economy, 2009). Bems, Johnson and Yi 
(2009) argue that “international supply chains are a leading contender for explaining why 
the great collapse was so great.”  28 
 
The channels through which vertical specialization exacerbated the trade collapse, 
however, have become the source of a heated debate. Using a simple Barbie doll 
example, O’Rourke (2009) demonstrated that vertical specialization cannot automatically 
explain why world trade overshot the drop in world GDP. The fact that components of 
the Barbie doll cross borders multiple times in the production of a final doll for US 
consumers does not necessarily imply that a drop in Barbie sales should lead to a 
disproportionate drop in trade. To explain the role of vertical specialization in the trade 
collapse, scholars have therefore focused on three additional effects: a compositional 
effect, a trade cost effect and a bullwhip effect.  
A number of studies have argued that vertical specialization has exacerbated the trade 
collapse through a compositional effect (Francois and Woerz, 2009; Levchenko, Lewis 
and Tesar, 2009; and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis, 2010). Vertical specialization 
has primarily taken place in durable goods sectors (consumer electronics, automobile and 
transport equipment, office equipment and computers, etc.), thus making trade and 
especially intra-GPN trade more intensive in durable goods than overall GDP. This 
compositional change has made trade more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.
19 In 
times of recession, households and companies tend to hold off first and foremost their 
purchases of durable goods, not only because tightening budget constraints render high 
ticket-item goods unaffordable for some, but also because consumers and firms want to 
postpone their purchases until it is known with more certainty whether and when the 
economic climate will improve. Since an economic crisis leads to a disproportionate drop 
in the demand for durable goods, the compositional effect can explain the lopsided 
collapse in trade compared to GDP. This assertion was backed up by Levchenko, Lewis 
and Tesar (2009) who found that, during the crisis, U.S. imports fell more in sectors that 
are intensively used as intermediate inputs.  
A second set of studies have argued that another part of the story is the rising trade costs 
associated with evaporating credit, increasing non-tariff barriers and home bias in 
government stimulus plans (Yi, 2009; and Jacks, Meissner and Novy, 2009). Jacks, 
Meissner and Novy (2009) estimate that trade costs have on average increased by 11% 
                                                            
19  Engel and Wang (2008) found that U.S. durable goods imports are more sensitive to business cycles than 
nondurable goods imports. 29 
 
between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.  Since intra-GPN trade 
is especially sensitive to changes in the trade costs (Section 5; Yi, 2003), this can explain 
the magnified fall in trade compared to GDP. 
A final explanation that has received less attention is the role of bullwhip effects in global 
supply chains on the trade collapse (Escaith and Gonguet, 2009; Escaith, Lindenberg and 
Miroudot, 2010; Ma and Van Assche, 2010). The bullwhip effect is one of the most 
researched and documented symptoms in the field of supply chains management (Lee, 
Padmanabhan and Wang, 1997; Cachon, Randall and Schmidt, 2007). It states that, when 
a downstream firm is confronted with a drop in demand for its final products, its first 
reaction is to run down its inventories. Thus a slowdown in downstream activities 
transforms itself into an amplified reduction in the demand for inputs that are located 
upstream.
20 Since fluctuations in final demand get amplified as one moves upstream 
along the supply chain, this provides an alternative explanation of the magnified fall in 
trade compared to GDP. 
Due to the data limitations highlighted in Section 2, most of the above-mentioned studies 
have relied on indirect measures to evaluate the role of vertical specialization on the trade 
collapse. In this section, we will use data on China’s processing trade regime to evaluate 
if there is direct evidence of a compositional effect, trade cost effect and bullwhip effect 
in GPNs during the Great Recession.  
The dataset that we will use in this section differs from the rest of the paper in an 
important way. Instead of using annual data, we will rely on processing trade data for the 
first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. Since the Great Recession hit China’s 
exports in the last quarter of 2008, the quarterly data allow us to analyze the initial impact 
of the Great Recession on China’s processing trade. As it is shown in Table 8, the initial 
impact of the crisis was huge.   In the first quarter of 2009, demand for China’s exports 
experienced a stunning contraction of 19.9% compared to the previous year, from 
US$304 billion to US$243 billion. We now turn to the analysis of the three effects.  
                                                            
20 Mason-Jones and Towill (2000) provide the following explanation of a bullwhip effect: “If demand for 
products is transmitted along a series of inventories using stock control ordering, then the demand variation 
will increase with each transfer”. 30 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
6.1.1. Compositional effect 
To verify if the trade collapse during the Great Recession was concentrated in industries 
with large vertical specialization, we first need to identify in which type of industry 
China’s processing exports are most prevalent. For this purpose, we use the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) technology classification 
(Hatzichronoglou, 1997) to disaggregate China’s exports into four categories: high 
technology exports, medium-high technology exports, medium-low technology exports, 
low technology exports. In Figure 10, we depict the share of processing exports in 
China’s total exports for each technology category. The figure shows that vertical 
specialization is more prevalent in the higher technology categories than in the lower 
technology categories. In 2007, processing exports accounted for 84.9% of high-
technology exports; 45.6% of medium-high-technology exports; 26.6% of medium-low-
technology exports; and 29.8% of low technology exports. 
[Figure 11 about here] 
The higher technology categories are also the industries that saw a larger exports collapse 
during the Great Recession. As it is shown in Table 8, high technology exports dropped 
24.1% in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier; medium-high technology 
exports dropped 22.0%; medium-low technology exports dropped 21.6%; low technology 
exports dropped 8.9%. 
Furthermore, the higher technology categories are also the industries that contributed 
most to the drop in China’s exports during the Great Recession. As it is shown in Table 8, 
high technology exports, which accounted for almost one third of China’s exports in the 
first quarter of 2008, contributed to 37.6% of the exports collapse; medium-high 
technology exports contributed to 25.4%; medium-low technology exports contributed to 
16.0%;  low technology exports contributed to 10.9%; and other non-manufacturing 
exports contributed to 10.1% 31 
 
In sum, we find evidence of a compositional effect in China’s exports during the Great 
Recession. The sectors that contributed most to the export collapse are those where 
vertical specialization is more prevalent.
21  
 
6.1.2.   Trade cost effect 
Next, we want to investigate if there is evidence of a trade cost effect in China’s trade 
during the Great Recession. As we have shown in Section 5, intra-GPN trade is generally 
more sensitive to trade costs than regular trade. If trade costs have risen significantly 
during the Great Recession, we therefore should find that processing exports have 
consistently dropped more than non-processing exports from the first quarter of 2008 to 
the first quarter of 2009. 
To adequately control for compositional effects, we conduct the analysis at the most 
disaggregated level in China’s trade data – the HS 8-digit level. Specifically, we examine 
whether, at the HS 8-digit level, there is evidence that the share of China’s processing 
exports in total exports has significantly declined from the first quarter of 2008 to the first 
quarter of 2009.  The results are presented in Table 9. In line with the trade cost effect, 
the t-test on equality of means finds that the share of processing exports in total exports 
was significantly lower in the first quarter of 2009 than a year earlier. 
 [Table 9 about here] 
In sum, we find evidence of a trade cost effect in China’s exports during the Great 
Recession. After controlling for compositional effects, processing exports have 
consistently dropped more during the Great Recession than non-processing exports. 
6.1.3.  Bullwhip effect 
Finally, we want to investigate whether there is a bullwhip effect in intra-GPN trade. In 
other words, we want to analyze if the percentage decline in China’s processing imports 
exceeded the percentage decline in processing exports during the Great Recession. A first 
indication of a bullwhip effect is that, despite China’s relatively robust economic growth 
                                                            
21 In line with this result, Aziz and Li (2008) demonstrate that China’s increasing specialization in 
electronics exports has led to an overall rise in the income elasticity of China’s exports. 32 
 
in 2008 and 2009, the percentage drop in China’s processing imports was larger than that 
of processing exports in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier.
22 China’s 
processing exports dropped 23.7%, while processing imports declined 36.2% (see Table 
10).   
[Table 10 about here] 
The evidence of a bullwhip effect is confirmed when the analysis is disaggregated to the 
industry level. As it is shown in Table 10, in 15 out of the 20 industries the percentage 
change in processing imports had been more pronounced than the percentage change in 
processing exports. 
The existence of a bullwhip effect in China’s processing trade helps to explain at least 
partially the resilience of China’s economy in the realm of the great trade collapse (Ma 
and Van Assche, 2009). When the crisis hit China in the second half of 2008, its 
economy was able to rapidly pass on the negative export demand shock to its input 
suppliers through a reduction in demand for processing inputs. Indeed, since the drop in 
imports was larger than the drop in exports in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year 
earlier, China’s net exports actually increased.   
The largest sufferers of the bullwhip effect in China’s processing trade were its East 
Asian neighbors. As it is shown in Figure 9, the Great Recession has hit most severely 
China’s imports from economies that more intensively supply China with its processing 
inputs, that is, its East Asian neighbors. With the exception of Vietnam and Indonesia, 
more than 40% of China’s imports from its major East Asian trading partners were 
processing imports in 2006, which is a significantly higher share than for countries 
outside of East Asia. These East Asian countries have witnessed the largest import 
decline in the realm of the recent global economic crisis. Compared to the previous year, 
China’s imports from its major East Asian trading partners have all declined between 
25% and 61% in the first quarter of 2009. In contrast, China’s imports from its major 
non-Asian trading partners have dropped less than 20%. 
                                                            
22 In the first and second quarter of 2009, China’s GDP has expanded at an annualized rate of 6.1% and 
7.9%, respectively. 33 
 
[Figure 12 about here] 
In sum, we find supporting evidence that GPNs have exacerbated the great trade collapse 
during the Great Recession through three channels: a compositional effect, a trade cost 
effect and a bullwhip effect. First, in line with the compositional effect, we find that the 
sectors that contributed most to the Chinese exports collapse are those where processing 
trade is more prevalent. Second, we show that, within industries, processing exports 
consistently dropped more than non-processing exports during the Great Recession. This 
is in line with the trade cost effect since intra-GPN trade should be more sensitive to trade 
costs than regular trade. Third, in line with the bullwhip effect, we show that in virtually 
all industries, the drop in demand for China’s processing exports led to a magnified drop 
in processing imports.  
7.  Conclusion 
What role do trade costs have on intra-GPN trade? Recent theoretical work has 
demonstrated the importance of this question, yet it has proven to be hard to empirically 
evaluate. We have tackled this question by using a unique data set on China’s processing 
trade regime. Under this customs regime, firms are granted duty exemptions on imported 
raw materials and other inputs as long as they are used solely for export purposes. As a 
result, the data set provides information on trade between three sequential nodes of a 
global supply chain: the location of input production, the location of processing (in 
China) and the location of further consumption. This makes it possible to examine the 
role of both trade costs related to the import of inputs (upstream trade costs) and trade 
costs related to the export of final goods (downstream trade costs) on intra-GPN trade.  
In a first step to evaluate the role of trade costs on China’s processing trade, we have 
developed a three-country industry-equilibrium model in which heterogeneous firms 
from two advanced countries, East and West, sell their products in each other’s markets. 
Each firm can use two modes to serve the foreign market. It can directly export its 
products from its home country. Alternatively, it can indirectly export to the foreign 
market by assembling its product in a third low-cost country, China, which is assumed to 
be located closer to East than to West. Our model illustrates that China’s processing 34 
 
exports should not only depend on downstream trade costs (export distance), but also on 
upstream trade costs (import distance), and the interaction of both. Using China’s 
bilateral processing trade data, we have found empirical support for this complex impact 
of trade costs on intra-GPN trade. 
A key theoretical prediction by Yi (2003) is that intra-GPN trade should be more 
sensitive to changes in trade costs than regular trade since vertical specialization leads to 
products crossing borders many more times before reaching the final consumer. Rubin 
and Tal (2008) and Rubin (2009) have built on this theory to conjecture that rising oil 
prices will increase trade costs, thus leading to a major slowdown in the growth of world 
trade and especially intra-GPN trade. To test this conjecture, we have used the panel data 
structure of the processing trade data to analyze the sensibility of intra-GPN trade to 
changes in oil prices. We have found evidence that China’s processing exports indeed 
have become more sensitive to both upstream and downstream trade costs in times of 
rising oil prices. Furthermore, in line with Yi’s (2003) theoretical prediction, China’s 
processing exports have been found to be more sensitive to oil price movements than 
non-processing exports.    
Finally, we have used the processing trade data to analyze the role of GPNs in the large 
trade collapse during the recent Great Recession. In line with the predictions of many 
trade economists, we found that the Great Recession led to a disproportionate drop in 
China’s processing exports compared to non-processing exports, thus suggesting that 
GPNs played a key role in the trade decline. Part of this was a compositional effect. The 
sectors that contributed most to China’s exports collapse were those where processing 
exports were more prevalent. However, even within highly disaggregated industries, we 
have found that processing exports consistently dropped more than non-processing 
exports, thus suggesting that intra-GPN trade is more sensitive to business cycle 
fluctuations than regular trade. Furthermore, in line with the bullwhip effect, we showed 
that in virtually all industries, the drop in demand for China’s processing exports led to a 
magnified drop in processing imports, thus feeding the trade collapse.   
Our analysis provides new insights into the success of China’s export-oriented growth 
strategy. To a large extent, prior studies have attributed China’s dramatic exports rise to 35 
 
domestic factors – its relatively low labor costs coupled with its aggressive export 
promotion policies. Our study, however, suggest that another key driver has been China’s 
geographic location within the dynamic East Asian region. Specifically, its proximity to 
East Asian input suppliers (supplier access) and its vicinity of large and growing East 
Asian consumer markets (market access) both have strongly boosted its attractiveness as 
an export-processing platform.  
There are nonetheless policy actions that developing countries can take to deepen their 
integration into global production networks. Since intra-GPN trade is negatively affected 
by both upstream and downstream trade costs, and since intra-GPN trade is more 
sensitive to trade costs than regular trade, trade-cost reducing policies should be 





In this appendix, we derive the closed form solution for China’s processing exports to country i, 
ΩO
    ΩT
  , where Ω 
   denotes the aggregate industry sales of type-k firms in industry i (see text). 
This will allow us to derive Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Consider first the derivation of ΩO
   and ΩT
  . In our model, four types of firms sell their products in 
advanced country i: type-D domestic firms, type-O domestic firms, type-X foreign firms and 
type-T foreign firms. The representative consumer spends amount    on industry output:              
     ΩD
    ΩO
    ΩX
    ΩT
  , (A-1) 
where Ω 
   denotes the aggregate industry sales of type-k firms in industry i. If we divide both 
sides of equation (A-1) by ΩO
   and rearrange, we obtain: 
ΩO
   
Y 
  σD,O
   σX,O
   σT,O
  ,                               (A-2) 
where σk,l captures the relative market share of type-k firms to type-l firms in country i. In 
other words,  
  , 




 .  (A-3) 
Similarly, If we divide both sides of equation (A-1) by ΩT
   and rearrange, we obtain: 
ΩT
   
Y 
  σD,T
   σX,T
   σO,T
  .                   ( A - 4 )  
To derive a closed-form solution for ΩO
   and ΩT
  , we can then plug in the industry sales 
Ω 
   from Table 4 on page 16 into equation (A-3) and then into (A-2). Furthermore, we 
can use the assumption that firms randomly draw a labor-per-unit-output coefficient of   
from a cumulative Pareto distribution      with shape parameter z. In that case, 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that     , is also Pareto with the shape 
parameter z − (ε − 1). The Pareto distribution implies that  
     




       
 (A-5) 
for every    and    in the support of the distribution of a. Inserting equation (A-5) into 
equations (A-2) and using the cutoff conditions in Table 3 then yields:  37 
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Using equation (A-5) and Table (A-1), it is relatively straightforward to prove 
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Figure 1: Proportion of processing trade in China’s total trade, 1988-2008 
 























Figure 2: Domestic and foreign content share of China’s processing and non-
processing exports 
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Figure 4: Share of Processing Exports, by region of destination, 1988-2008 
 








































Figure 5: Processing imports as a share of China’s total imports, by country 

























































Figure 6: Processing exports as a share of China’s total exports, by 
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Figure 10: Average crude oil prices, US$/barrel, 1980-2009 
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Figure 11: Share of processing exports in China’s total exports, by technology level 
(%) 
 














Figure 12: Intensity of China’s processing imports (2008) versus severity of China’s 
imports contraction (08Q1-09Q1), by economy of origin. 
 











































































































East Asia  85.0  71.2  49.3  28.2 
  Hong Kong SAR, 
China  45.3 ‐  29.3 ‐  
  Japan  11.3  18.7  8.2  11.6 
  South Korea  11.3  21.9  4.2  6.0 
  Singapore  2.9  4.6  2.3  3.3 
  Taiwan, China  8.6  13.3  1.6  2.2 
  Malaysia  1.8  3.2  1.4  1.9 
  Thailand  1.4  4.9  0.7  1.0 
  Philippines  1.5  2.5  0.5  0.7 
  Vietnam  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.5 
  Indonesia  0.5  1.4  0.5  0.8 
  Macau  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3 
  
Non‐Asian OECD  10.4  20.0  42.1  59.6 
  United States  4.3  6.2  18.2  25.7 
  EU‐19  4.8  0.9  19.4  27.5 
  Canada  0.5  0.8  1.3  1.8 
  Australia  0.3  0.5  1.2  1.7 
  Other  0.5  0.9  2.0  2.8 
  
ROW  4.6  8.8  8.6  12.2 
Authors’ calculations using China’s Customs Statistics Data   56 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are included in the text.   57 
 
Table 5 
Regression results, 1988-2008 
Dependent variable: log of bilateral processing exports 
OLS 
(1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita (province)  1.655*** 1.601*** 1.609*** 
     [0.132] [0.133] [0.133] 
Population (province)  3.968*** 3.884*** 3.872*** 
[0.215] [0.216] [0.213] 
Wage (province)  -0.541*** -0.616*** -0.621*** 
[0.112] [0.114] [0.114] 
Export Distance  -0.505*** -0.504***  0.087 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.223] 
Import Distance  -0.170*** -0.342*** 
[0.058] [0.061] 
East*Export Distance  -0.570*** 
[0.233] 
East *Import Distance  0.576*** 
[0.070] 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   17306 17299 17299 
 R
2  0.835 0.836 0.836 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; 






Regression results, 1988-2008 
Dependent variable: log of bilateral processing exports 
OLS  Hausman Taylor Estimator 
(1) (2)
a (3) (4) 
GDP per capita (province)  1.609*** 1.7137***  1.5666***  1.7733*** 
     [0.133] [0.102] [0.101] [0.103] 
Population (province)  3.872*** 3.7072***  3.3027***  4.0353*** 
[0.213] [0.196] [0.187] [0.204] 
Wage (province)  -0.621*** -0.4870***  -0.3337***  -0.5698*** 
[0.114] [0.104] [0.102] [0.105] 
Export Distance  0.087 -0.1498  -0.3401  -0.0270 
[0.223] [0.215] [0.212] [0.217] 
Import Distance  -0.342*** -0.3255***  -0.3377***  -0.3158*** 
[0.061] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] 
East*Export Distance  -0.570*** -0.3650  -0.1662 -0.4919** 
[0.233] [0.224] [0.221] [0.226] 
East *Import Distance  0.576*** 0.6246***  0.6412***  0.6299*** 
[0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   17299 17285 17285 17285 
 R
2  0.837 
Hausman test HT vs. GLS (χ
2)  1791.36 10354.41 6004.33 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; 
*** means significant at 1%. 
Column 2: endogenous variables = GDP per capita (province), GDP per capita (country), import distance. 
Column 3: endogenous variables = import distance. 





Regression results, 1988-2008 
Dependent variable:  log of bilateral processing exports  log of share of processing exports 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (province)  1.601***  1.309***  1.279***  -0.007  -0.070  -0.080 
     [0.133]  [0.132]  [0.133] [0.079] [0.080] [0.080] 
GDP  per  capita  (country)  1.928*** 1.828*** 1.839*** 0.411*** 0.365*** 0.378*** 
     [0.229]  [0.231]  [0.231] [0.123] [0.123] [0.123] 
Population  (province)  3.866*** 2.753*** 2.785*** 1.280*** 0.973*** 1.014*** 
[0.214] [0.230] [0.236] [0.124] [0.141] [0.145] 
Population  (country)  1.148*** 1.124*** 1.124*** -0.125** -0.135** -0.135** 
[0.150] [0.150] [0.149] [0.062] [0.061] [0.061] 
Wage (province)  -0.608***  -0.826***  -0.851*** -0.543*** -0.619*** -0.634*** 
[0.114] [0.115] [0.117] [0.071] [0.072] [0.073] 
Export Distance  -0.512***  -0.272***  0.492  0.048**  0.169***  0.908*** 
[0.042] [0.103] [0.332] [0.024] [0.060] [0.192] 
Import Distance  -0.160***  0.785***  1.654***       
[0.057] [0.117] [0.325]       
Oil Price * Export Distance      -0.307**       -0.299*** 
   [0.128]       [0.076] 
Oil Price * Internal Distance       0.061***       0.014 
   [0.023]       [0.011] 
Oil Price * Import Distance      -0.352***       
   [0.131]      
Trend * Export Distance    -0.021***  0.001    -0.011**  0.011 
 [0.008]  [0.012]  [0.005]  [0.007] 
Trend * Internal Distance    -0.008***  -0.012***    -0.004***  -0.005*** 
 [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Trend * Import Distance    -0.073***  -0.045***       
 [0.009]  [0.014]      
Year  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-year  Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  17285 17285 17285 19605 19605 19605 
R-squared  0.836 0.839 0.839 0.426 0.427  0.428 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; 







Technology category  Exports value (US$ billion)  Growth rate (%) Share of exports (%) 
Contribution to total 
export growth (%) 
08Q1 09Q1  08Q1-09Q1  08Q1  09Q1  08Q1-09Q1 
High technology  94.6  71.8  -24.1  31.1  29.5  37.6 
Medium-high technology  70  54.6  -22.0  23.0  22.5  25.4 
Medium-low technology  44.9  35.2  -21.6  14.8  14.5  16.0 
Low technology  73.8  67.2  -8.9  24.3  27.6  10.9 
Other 20.5  14.4  -29.8  6.7  5.9  10.1 
Total 303.8  243.2  -19.9  100.0  100.0  100.0 




Variables Number  of  observations  Mean 
Standard 
error 
Share of processing exports in 
total exports, 08Q1  4760  0.31  0.004 
Share of processing exports in 
total exports, 09Q1  4760  0.29  0.004 
Difference 9520  0.020***  0.003 
Notes: * means significant at 10%; ** means significant at 5%; *** means significant at 1%. 62 
 
Table 10: China’s Processing Trade in Crisis, by industry 












   08Q1  09Q1  08Q1-09Q1  08Q1  09Q1 08Q1-09Q1 Bullwhip  effect 
High  technology  78.32  57.23 -26.9  45.88  29.03 -36.6  YES
Aircraft 0.21  0.23  8.6  0.11  0.09  -17.8  NO
Pharmaceuticals 0.37  0.36  -3.3 0.08  0.09 24.0  NO
Office and computing machinery  30.70  23.80  -22.4  3.59  2.43  -32.5  YES
Radio, TV and comm. Equipment  38.50  27.80  -27.7  29.70  20.20  -31.9  YES
Medical, precision and optical ins.  8.54  5.05  -40.9  12.40  6.22  -49.8  YES
Medium-high technology  34.01  24.90  -26.9  13.59  9.79  -27.9  YES
Electrical machinery  10.50  7.43  -29.4  6.27  4.34  -30.7  YES
Motor vehicles  3.37  1.37  -59.4  0.26  0.17  -35.0  NO
Chemicals 2.47  2.01  -18.4  2.10  1.41  -32.9  YES
Other transport equipment  0.87  0.79  -9.5  0.07  0.06  -13.1  YES
Machinery and equipment  16.80  13.30  -21.0  4.89  3.81  -22.0  YES
Medium-low  technology  12.67  12.04 -5.1  10.12  5.69 -43.8  YES
Shipbuilding and repairing  3.36  5.30  57.5  0.01  0.04  377.6  YES
Rubber and plastic products     4.57  3.59  -21.5  1.59  1.09  -31.5  YES
Petroleum products  0.05  0.04  -14.7  0.04  0.18  395.9  NO
Non-metallic mineral products  0.71  0.49  -31.1  0.66  0.37  -44.5  YES
Metal products  3.98  2.62  -34.3  7.82  4.01  -48.7  YES
Low technology  22.69  19.38  -14.6  6.57  4.69  -28.7  YES
Manufacturing 8.17  6.79  -16.9  0.73  0.52  -27.7  YES
Paper and paper products  1.38  0.98  -29.0  1.28  0.72  -44.0  YES
Printing and publishing  0.32  0.32  -1.3  0.06  0.05  -13.3  YES
Food, beverages and tobacco  1.32  1.35  2.5  0.71  0.50  -29.5  NO
Textiles, apparel and leather  11.50  9.94  -13.5  3.80  2.90  -23.8  YES
Other 4.55  2.63  -42.3  11.80  6.85  -41.8  NO
Total 152.24  116.18  -23.7  87.95  56.06  -36.2  YES
Source: Authors’ calculations using China’s Customs Statistics 